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ABSTRACI'

In this thesis I will examine the construction of the concept of

Virtual Reality. I argue that rather than a technology of liberation as it is
often perceived, virtual realities'

conception has

been influenced

significantly by a discourse of control and order. I examine books, articles
and films concerning Virtual Reality to support this claim. Furthermore

this discourse of control and order is born out of a larger ideology of
Western culture that values order and control. Throughout modernity this
ideology has manifested itself through techniques and technologies of
social and envirorunental control. I provide a brief historical outline
highlighting some of these techniques and technologies focusing
particularly upon surveillance. I suggest that under the gmding influence
of the ideology of order and control one possible future use for Virtual
Reality technology may be as a surveillance technology. The ideology of
order and control is born out of a desire to transcend the unpredictable
nature of life. 1hls desire is reflected in the VR proponents aim to create a

totally known and controlled artificial envirorunent. I contend that an
alternative way of thinking is needed so that objects such as Virtual
Reality can be used for more appropriate purposes other than controlling
and ordering. I draw upon the philosophy of Martin Heidegger to outline
a thinking that is more open, and reflective, and that embraces the chaotic

nature of existence. Such a thinking that is focused more upon the actual
conditions of our everyday lives, may yield uses for technologies such as
Virtual Reality that are more focused upon people's needs.
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1NTRODUCI10N.

Virtual Reality (or for short, VR) is a vague concept that has been
defined in many different ways.

Those in the field often have different

conceptions of what it achtally is. Definitions capture certain elements,

but leave out others.

For example, Sherman & Judkins (1992, p. 17)

associate Virtual Reality with immersion in an artificial environment:

"Virtual Reality allows you to explore a computer generated world by
actually being in it". By contrast Aukstakalnis & Blatner (1992, p. 7)
associate VR more with the notion of interaction between a user and a

computer: "Virtual Reality is a way for humans to visualize, manipulate,
and interact with computers and extremely complex data ... Instead of
using screens and keyboards, people can put displays over their eyes,
gloves on their hands, and headphones on their ears". Immersion and

interaction are just two aspects among several that make up the complete

picture of Virtual Realiiy. Heim (1993, pp. 110-117) outlines simulation,
artifidality, immersion, telepresence, interaction and networked communications

as the six areas of Virtual Reality technology. Often these concepts overlap
and a VR system may contain several of them at once.

Simulation refers to the acting out of possible situations through the

use of VR technology. The most obvio\\s example is a flight-simulator
where the aim is to simulate the situation of flying an aeroplane without
actually having to physically fly a real plane. The technology used in a
flight simulator may be as simple as a visual screen, or may indude the

construction of a complete cockpit- the intent is still the same. Closely
linked to simulation is the idea of artificiality. The experience in the cockpit
of the flight simulator may seem identical to the real thing, yet it is ,m
1
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artificial experience without the same consequences as flying a real
aeroplane.

Immersion refers to the sensory experience of actually being within

the virtual environment. The watching of a screen is a remote experience.
The viewer is separate from what is occurring on the screen. VR reduces
this boundruy by making you feel as if you are in a three dimensional
environment. One way this phenomenon is created is by the use of three
dimensional visual displays located directly over the eyes.

Imtnersion is a form of telepresence. Literally telepresence means to
be remotely present. It refers to the phenomenon where you are

represented as being present within a virtual environment, whilst you are
actually physically somewhere else. Your sensory immersion in the

environment adds to this phenomenon of telepresence.

Virtual Reality has several different forms of interaction. It has the
interaction between you and the hardware. 'A'hen you move your hand
within the data glove, you send a signal to the coltlputer. TI1ere is also the
sense that you interact with the artificial environment. You remotely
move around the environment and influence its composition. Another
possible form of interaction is with other people in the artificial
environment. Perhaps there are other people plugged into the same VR
system as you, giving you the opportunity to interact with them.

Tilis third type of interaction brings up the area of networked

communications. Tilis is a phenomenon that is not directly related to Virtual
Reality. · Networked communication is not a necessary aspect of the
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experience of VR, such as the feeling of immersion. Rather it is a possible
use that has been associated with Virtual Reality technology. Instead of
communicating using the phone

with only aural cues we could

communicate in a virtual environment, conveying an experience that, with

the continuing advancement of VR technology, could be tantamount to
face to face communication.

This is one of the chief goals that VR proponents espouse- a virtual
agora. On this point I think there is some overlap between Virtual Reality
and the Internet.

Any networked communication needs a system that

connects people together, and the Internet is the perfect tool for this.
Rheingold espouses this ideal of a community connected to each other
through the Internet in his book, The Virtual Community (1993).

This notion of an on-line virtual world is captured in the word
'cyberspace'. Coined by William Gibson in his novel Neuromancer (1986),
the concept of cyberspace has been taken and appropriated as a utopian
vision of the Virtual Community-as a "massive interactive cyber ftm

park" (Dovey, 1996, p. xiv). Benedikt (1991, p. 122) defines cyberspace as
"a globally networked, computer sustained, computer-accessed, and
computer generated, multidimensional, artificial, or 'virtual' reality". It is

this idea that I see as central to the hopes of the VR gurus.

It is their

ultimate dream to create an alternative reality that we can access from

wherever we are in the world. It has not yet been achieved but is the goal
that the prophets of cyberspace dre aiming for. Raymond Kurzweil (2000,
p. 24) predicts that by 2020 "web-based, high resolution, three
dimensional visual and audito;y virtual reality, and realistic allencompassing tactile environments will enable people to do virtually
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anything with anybody regardless of physical proximity". 'lnternet2' is a
research project involving 170 academics and 50 corporations that is

currently trying to create the technology to enable these on-line virtual
environments (Ditlea, 2000, p. 28). This conception of cyberspace has often
been described as a liberatory project. As Robins and Webster (1999, p. 2)
point out, "a distinctive technoculture emerged in the 1990's, fired with
enthusiasm for what were perceived as the emancipatory possibilities of

'cyberspace' and 'virtual reality'". This dream of a techno-utopian realm
is the particular conception of Virtual Reality that I examine within this
thesis.

In the first chapter I look at the historical context in which the

ideology of control and order was created and how this ideology paved
the way for the conception of Virtual Reality. In the second chapter I
examine how a discourse of Virtual Reality purporting to be about
liberation in fact reflects the ideology of control and order. The third
chapter explores some of the implications of Virtual Realities' alignment
with the modern rational mindset. I show how technology under this
ideology has been used as a tool of social control. I suggest that Virtual
Reality might be used for similar purposes. The final chapter offers an
alternative way of thinking that may provide a different conception of
Virtual Reality and technology. This thinking may yield more open and
positive uses for teclmologies like Virtual Reality that have not been
widely discussed in the atmosphere created by the ideology of control and
order.

THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN
IDEOLOGY OF ORDER AND
CONTROL

In this chapter I will look at the ideology that gave rise to Virtual
Reality. All technologies, including Virtual Reality, were not created in a
social vacuum but are products of a set of social circumstances. The way
teclmologies are used, and the discourses around them reflect the

attitudes of that society. As Dickson (1974, p. 41) points out:
we must look at the specific set of conditions that initially
gave rise to these developments by retracing the history of
technology. Some idea will begin to emerge of the incentives
behind the process of technological innovation. These will
indicate the type of social and political values implicit in the
design of contemporary technology.
To outline the complete history of technology is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. I will instead provide a brief sketch of how Virtual Reality is
a cultural artifact of modernity. More specifically I argue that Virtual
Reality is based upon the valuing of rationalist control and the power to
order things that is an essential element of modernity.

Modernit)!:.

It is almost impossible to define modernity as any one thing. For

Berman (1983, p. 15) the phrase that most accurately describes modernity
comes from Marx's Communist Manifesto: "All that is solid Melts into
air". Berman is essentially drawing on Baudelaire's (cited in Foucault,

1991, p 39)

view of Modernity as, "the ephemeral, the fleeting, the
5
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contingent". It is remarkable how much these statements reflect the
phenomenon of Virtual Reality, yet as practical definitions they fail to teU
us what modernity is.

Thompson (1995, p. 45) takes a more practical stance saying that,
"Modern societies involved a distinctive set of economic changes through

which European feudalism was graduaUy transformed into a new system
of capitalist production and exchange". Although the capitalist economy is
a crucial element of modern societies, modernity involved more than just

an economic system. It included new attitudes towards science, art,

politics and theology that are difficult to capture in a succinct definition.
As HaU (1992, p. 6) contends, modernity "was the outcome, not of a single
process, but of the condensation of a number of different processes and
histories .. .it is these features which, taken together, provide us with a

definition of 'modernity"'. I cannot list aU these features here, but we can
now conceive modernity as: various modes of social organisation and

attitudes that grew out of medieval Europe and became widespread
throughout the Western world.

Trying to locate when modernity began is just as difficult as trying
to define it. Thompson (1995, p. 48) chooses the time when the printing

press was invented as the symbolic beginning: "by 1450 a distinctive
system of commodity production and exchange had emerged in Europe".
Giddens (1991, p. 1) opts for the Seventeenth century, whilst Berman
(1983, p. 16) prefers the sixteenth century.

When Modernity began and how exactly to define it is peripheral
to this project. The aim is to locate the ideology valuing control and order
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as a part of the culture of modernity. I can then later reveal how Virtual
Reality as an object of modernity has those same values of order and
control inscribed into its development as a concept.

"The Enlightenment.

The valuing of control and order that is a part of modernity is
crystallised in much Enlightenment thought.

The Enlightenment is a

movement that approximately occurred during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Like modernity, trying to locate a beginning and an
end to the Enlightenment is difficult. Outram (1995, p. 3) instead views
the Enlightenment as a process:
It is more helpful to think of the Enlightenment as a series of

problems and debates, of 'flash-points', characteristic of the
eighteenth century, or of 'pockets' where projects of
intellectual expansion impacted upon and changed the

nature of developments in society and government on a
world wide basis.
So what was the process that the Enlightenment centred around?
According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1979 p. 3), "the program of the
Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world". There was a change
from the dominance of religious and mythical explanations of the world to

a scientific one. People such as Gahleo Galilei, Isaac Newton, Francis
Bacon and Rene Descartes began to question long held beliefs. Gay (cited
in Outram, 1995, p. 8) defines the program of the Enlightenment as one of,
"hostility to religion and as a search for 'freedom' and 'progress' achieved

by a critical use of reason to change man's relations with himself and
society". Linked to this 'disenchantment of the world'

were two key
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words of Enlightenment thinking: reason and rationality.

In Cassircr's

words the Enlightenment was, "a value system rooted in rationality"

(cited in Outram, 1995, p. 3). It was a body of thought that put faith in the
power of the rational mind to discover the' true' nature of things.

This type of thought is exemplified by Rene Descartes. At the
beginniog of his First Meditation Descartes (1997, p. 134) sums up the
project of the Enlighterunent by announcing:
It is now some years since I detected how many were the

false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as
true, and how doubtful was everything I had since
constructed on this basis; and from that time I was
convinced that I must once and for all seriously undertake

to rid myself of all opinions which I had formerly accepted,
and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I
wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in
the sciences.
From there Descartes begins a process where he attempts to understand

what he can be certain about and what he should doubt. He comes to the
conclusion that the only thing he can be certain about is his own mind
because "I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or

that I mentally conceive it" (Descartes, 1997, p. 140). Descartes elevates the
conscious mind to the one absolute. A consequence of this is that there is a

separation between subject and object. Due to the assertion that the mind
is the only absolute there is no sense of interrelation between the human
subject and the envirorunent. Everything separate from the mind becomes
objectified, and can be manipulated and controlled. There is a distance

between humans and their environment. This is evident in Descartes'
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belief that animals are similar to machines, (1997, p. 107} and also in his
view that, "the difference between a living and a dead body was
analogous to that between a watch wound and unwound" (Turney 1998,
p. 15).

This, and other similar views of the Enlightenment, gave rise to a
consciousness within western society that accepted the primacy of

rationality in order to regulate the environment. This type of thought was
essential in the creation of the social structures that came to be known as

modernity. Society was no longer dominated by unchallenged sources of
authority, such as the church. As the phrase, 'Disenchantment of the
World' suggests, there was an emphasis on laying the world bare, so that
it could be examined and controlled. Descartes' hopes reflected the

emphasis on control in Enlightenment thinking:
Instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught
in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by
means of which, knowing the force and the action of
fire, water, air ... as distinctly as we know the different
crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ

them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and
thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of

nature (cited in Leiss, 1972, p. 81}.
TIUnking along these lines became prominent during the Enlightenment
and has influenced the trajectory of Western society.

Horkheirner and Adorno develop a sustained critique of this perspective
of the Enlightenment. They argue that the type of reasoning valued in the
Eulightenment by those such as Descar',es is defined by "the creation of a
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unified, scientific order" (1979, p. 81). Reason is "the organ of calculation,
of planning ... its element is coordination" {Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979, p.

88). They believe that thi; joining of thinking with order and control set
western society along a path that ultimately led to the development of
totalitarian regimes. They claim that "Enlightenment is totalitarian" (1979,
p. 6). I argue that it is the values of the Enlightenment outlined here, and
exemplified in Descartes' work that are now inscribed in the concept of

Virtual Reality.

Heide~er's

Theory of 'Enframent'

A primary way this consciousness of control manifested itself
within western society was through the rise of modem science and
technology. As Heidegger (1977, pp. 167-168) states:
Science sets upon the real. It orders it into place to the end
that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as an
interacting network, i.e, in su.-veyable series of related

causes. The real thus becomes surveyable and capable of
being followed out in sequences. The real becomes secured

in its abjectness.
In many fields of science ordering and categorisation are paramount. The

most recent example is the Human Genome Project which is currently
outlining the genetic code of all human life.

This striving to get everything under control results in what

Heidegger calls the 'standing reserve'. Objects are only seen in terms of
their use to serve an end. "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by,
to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on
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call for a further ordering. We call it the standing reserve" (Heidegger,
1977, p. 17). There are many examples of this within the hL•tory of
modernity. The advent of mining on a large scale is perhaps the most
obvious. Western societies plough the land for fossil fuels and uranium,

so that they can be used for energy. Durkheim (cited in Beniger, 1986, p.
219) states that, "the most vital trait of the spontaneous organisation of the
industrial order is that its goal, and its exclusive goal, is to increase the
control of man over things".

One of the consequences of this is a narrow world view where

objects are only seen as part of the standing reserve. Francis Bacon
confidently claims that science, "takes off the mask <IDd veil from natural
objects, which are commonly concealed and obscured under the variety of
shapes and external appearance" (cited in Leiss, 1972, p. 139). Yet there is
also the other side where sclence can be seen to cast a "veil of ideas" over

the nature of everyday experience. (Husser! cited in Leiss, 1972, p. 139).

Hill (1988, p. 39) expresses the opposing side:
Through today's technologies we stand apart from the
world, whilst our relationship to this world is mediated
through an opaque 'black box' of technique. The relationship
of people to this world is thus 'enframed' by what
technology does, its use value in transforming the world for
human advantage, and an aesthetic that views harmonious

relationship and order as rational control.

For Heidegger modem society's striving to control and master
everything is at the heart of technology. He calls the process of ordering
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everything for the standing reserve, 'Enframing'. ''We now name that
challenging claim that gathers man thither to order the self revealing as

standing reserve: "Gc-Stc/1" fEnframing]" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 19).
Enframing is what drives modern science and technology.

The ideology of control and order moy result in the objectification
of the environment, but it also results in the objectification of people. With
the separation between subject and object other people are seen as no

different to the items that make up the natural world. 1hey are both
separate from the personal ego, and are consequently seen as object.

Humanity is part of the natural environment and is treated in the same
manner. As Leiss (1972, pp. 15-16) argues:
the attempt to master external nature has a close and

perhaps inextricable relationship with the evolution of new
means of exercising domination over men or, alternatively,

human activity becomes so much a part of the natural
environment that mastery of nature and mastery of man are

only two aspects of the same process.

Heidegger feared that man would become part of the standing
reserve- a ccmmodity for use:

As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man
even as object, but does so, rather exclusively as standing-

reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but
the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the
very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point
where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve
(1977 p. 27).
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This is something that has afflicted modern 'man'. With the advent of
industrial society, and then a more advanced form of capitalism, people
have been used as a resource to be controlled and ordered.

The Valuing of Order and Control: Industrial Society.

Oppression existed before the advent of modernity within Europe,
yet not with the same emphasis upon rationalisation and efficiency that
was an integral part of the emerging modern consciousness. The process

of industrialisation that began

in England in the eighteenth century

changed the Western world (Cameron, 1993, p 163).

The industrial

revolution marked a divergence where, 11 most production moved from the

domestic unit to the factory, markets existed for just about everything, the
scale of operations expanded, economic activity became increasingly
internationalised, and products, services, and techniques that were totally

unknown before came into existence" (Rider, 1995, p. 177).

One of the major changes that occurred was the introduction of the
factory. According to Heilbroner (1993, p. 78), "the Industrial Revolution
was characterized by the rise of the factory to the center of social as well as
economic life". One of the impetuses behind the creation of these factories
was the increased ability of employers to control their employees. Rider
{1995 pp. 197-198) sums up the situation:
The factory concentrated workers in one place, aiding
employer supervision. This contrasts with the domestic,
putting out system, in wltich ... the worker controlled the
pace at which work was accomplished. This limited the
merchant-capitalist's complete control of production and his
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profit making ability.
Many of those em ploycd in the factories were women and children
because:

Employers believed them to be more efficient, most likely
because they were more obedient, and thus a docile, more

controllable labour force than men.
In conjunction with the rise of the technological society, more

sophisticated techniques of controlling people were created. In the third
chapter I look at the techniques that have been used in more recent times.

Mass Production.

The establishment of the industrial society coupled with more
advancements in science and technology were part of a complex process

that cleared a path for the system of mass production that became so
evident in the twentieth century.

The ever increasing scale and

complexity of industry around the tum of the twentieth century
precipitated what Beniger {1986, p. 427) has called a "crisis of control".
More advancements in technology and procedures were needed to bring
the complete system of production under greater control. Order and
control became esteemed values and were embedded further into Western
consciousness.

By the 1880s the concept of 'scientific management' had been
introduced by Frederick Taylor and Frank Gilbreth. They tried to break
the production process down into its simplest components, and create a
standardized system in order to improve efficiency. They:
studied all the different operations involved in production,
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selected the fastest way of accomplishing any given function
(which involved eliminating any inefficient movements) and
then recombined the operations into an efficient series. 'This

series became the 'standard' method of performing a

particular task (Rider, 1995, p. 423).
This type of organisation became widespread, and was epitomized by the

Ford motor company

which applied the processes of scientific

management and mass production with great success at the beginning of

the twentieth century ( See Rider, 1995, p. 329). One of the implications of
scientific management was that workers were only seen as part'5 in the

production machine. Taylor wrote: "In the past, the man has been first, in
the future the system must be first" (Cited in Beniger, 1986, p. 294 ).

This emphasis upon managing everything for efficiency resulted in

what Beniger called a 'control revolution'. This is:
a complex of rapid changes in the technological and
economic arrangements by which information is collected,

stored, processed, and communicated and through which
fo=al or programmed decisions can effect societal control
(Beniger, 1986, p. 427).
This control revolution stems from the Industrial Revolution and

continues, "unabated to this day" (Beniger, 1986, p. 427).

Advanced Capitalism.

The capitalist marketplace has progressively become more and
more complex and has required greater rates of information processing.
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This problem lead to the introduction of the computer: "Microprocessing

and computing technology, contrary to fashionable opinion, do not
represent a new force only recently unleashed on an unprepared society
but merely the most recent in';tallment in the continuing c.k~vclopment of

the Control Revolution" (Beniger, 1986, p. 435).

The prime task that the computer performs is ordering. IBM, one
of the largest computer companies in the world, was considering calling
their first personal computers,' ordinateur', a French word: "God was the

great ordinateur of the world; that is to say the one who made it orderly
and according to plan" (Woolley, 1992, p. 74). This machine of order has
now become one of the most pervasive and obvious symbols of western

capitalist society today. The uses for computers are varied yet they are
primarily used for organisation and categorisation. The computer's role as
orderer is revealed in the term 'word processor'. Language is seen as

something to be arranged. As Postman (1993, p 111) points out, "the
computer redefines humans as 'information processors' and nature itself

as information to be processed". The computer aids in reducing things to
be part of the standing reserve.

Virtual Reality.

It was the computer's ability to render the world as data that

ultimately led to the creation of Virtual Reality technology. In 1965 Ivan
Sutherland published an article entitled 'The Ultimate Display'. In it he
stated:
We live in a physical worid whose properties we have come
to know well through long familiarity ... We can predict where
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objects will fall, how well-known shapes look from other
angles and how much force is required to push objects
against friction. We lack corresponding familiarity with the
forces on charged particles, forces in non-uniform fields, the

effects of non-projective geometric transformations, and highinertia, low-friction motion. A display connected to a digital
computer gives us a chance to gain familiarity with concepts

not realizable in the physical world . It is a looking glass into
a mathematical wonderland (Cited in Pimental & Teixeira,
1993, p. 33).
Sutherland dreamed of a purely ahstract world of numbers, a purely
scientific, manufactured world. In 1966 he developed the first piece of
Virtual Reality technology: the head mounted display (HMO). This was
essentially a visual screen that was attached to the head and located
directly in front of the eyes so that nothing can be seen except what is on
the screen. (Pimental and Teixeira, 1993, p. 35) Around the same time
Myron Krueger was "experimenting with combining computers and video
systems to create' artificial realities' (a term he coined) at the University of
Wisconsin" (Pimental and Teixeira 1993 p 37). A growing interest in the
possibilities offered by these initial projects combined with advancements
in computing technology led to the consolidation of the concept of Virtual
Reality.

This outline of the modem ideology of order and control was provided

to give a historical perspective in which to locate the construction of
Virtual Reality. In the next chapter I examine how Virtual Reality
continues

the valuing of order and control that stems from the

Enlightenment.
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1HE DISCOURSES OF VIRTUAL REALITY.

Tlte Research 011 Cyberspace is a quest for God. To be God.
Paul Viri/io (1997, p. 44).

The development of the ideology of modern technology is long
and complex. In the previous chapter I have attempted a brief sketch of
that procedure in order to show the milieu that enabled the concept of
Virtual Reality to be developed. In this chapter I hope to show how the
sphere of thought around the idea of Virtual Realit'j embraces the
technological ideology of power and control.

One of the most striking things about those involved in Virtual
Reality is the way they perceive themselves and the technology of VR in
religious terms. There are many instances where VR pundits refer to

themselves as gods, or of the experience of VR being like that of a god. As
the name of the book suggests, Glimpses of Heaven, Visions of Hell (1992),
is one text that portrays this understanding of VR. It states: "so to a very
large extent VR allows us (or at least the designers of the virtual worlds) to
play God" (Sherman & Judkins, 1992, p. 127). Stewart Brand who coined
the phrase, 'personal computer' has stated: "we are as Gods, and might as
well get good at it" (cited in Kelly, 1994, p. 233). On another occasion
when talking about VR Brand said, "junior deities, we want to be" (cited
in Slouka, 1995, p. 71).

Laurel (1991, p. 95) starts an article on VR by quoting Genesis from
the Bible, "In the Beginning God created the heaven and earth". Myron
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Krueger uses the same comparison:

The world described in Genesis, created by mysterious

cosmic forces, was a volatile and dangerous place. 1t

moulded human life through incomprehensible caprice.
Natural beneficence tempered by natural disaster defined
reality. For centuries, the goal of human effort was to tap
nature's terrible power. Our success has been so complete,

that a new world has emerged. Created by human ingenuity,
itis an artificial reality (cited in Woolley, 1992, p. 7).
Benedikt goes a step further and compares cyberspace to Heaven: "The
image of the Heavenly City, in fact, is ... a religious version of cyberspace"
(Benedikt, 1991, pp. 14-16).

Kevin Kelly's book Out of Control (1994) is a perfect example of
the scientific attitude that extols the virtues of a near future where
scientific and technological control of the world is pervasive. In a chapter
called, 1God Games'

he discusses conventional computer games and

virtual environments. Like others he uses religious terminology. He calls
Jeff Haas, a designer of' god games' a "Super God" (1994, p. 231). He goes
on to describe his experience of a virtual world designed by Jaron Lanier
one of the most well known VR gurus:
At some point I hopped off the train near an inverted top
hat. I stood and watched the train chug around the loop of
track without me. I bent to grab the top hat and the instant I
touched it, it turned into a white rabbit. I heard someone
outside the world laugh, a heavenly chuckle. That was the
god's little joke (Kelly, 1994, p. 240).
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Like LaurPl and Krueger, at the close of the chapter he draws the
analogy between the biblical creation story and the creation of virtual
environments: "by now some of Yahweh's creatures have begun to gather

minerals from the earth to build their own model creatures ... The

simulacra they have built so far vary. Some species exist on another plane
of being-virtualspace" (Kelly, 1994, pp. 256-7).

Why is a modem technology described in such religious terms? I
believe that this writing about becoming a god reflects the VR proponents'
urge for power afl.d control. Those involved in VR research are drawing
on their own cultural knowledge (Western Judea-Christian theology) to
explain how they conceive this new technology. As Helmreich (cited in
Noble, 1999, p. 171) points out, "scientists invoke normative notions of
God and Judea-Christian cosmology when they speak about artificial
worlds". Their identification with Christian doctrine, where "abhorrence

of the body is inherent"(Penny, 1994, p. 235) and where God is an all
powerful and controlling being accurately reflects their own desires for
order and control.

Noble argues that western society since medieval times has drawn
on Christian religious myths to explain technology (1999). I believe that
this religious element is part of the overall ideology of modem technology

that enforces the values of ordering and controlling the human
environment. It is part of the same ideology that instigated the Human
Genome Project that is credited by Bill Clinton as revealing "the language
in which God created life" (Cited in Alcorn, 2000, p. 10). Physicist Richard
Seed when speaking about research into human DNA said, "We are going
to become one with God. We are going to have almost as much
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knowledge and almost as much power as God" (cited in Noble, 1999, p.
vii). The Genome Project shares the same value system as the physicist's

goal of a 'theory of everything' that according to Stephen Hawking will
reveal 'the mind of God' (Cited in Wertheim, 1995, p. 13).

One common way technologies of ordering and control are used

most effectively is in the military. VR technology is no different as it is also
being applied in the military:
Video games in the wider culture are also about the mastery
of anxiety and mobilization of omnipotence phantasies ... The
parallel with weapons systems runs deep; after all, some
innovators have alternated between designing military and
entertainment versions of interactive simulation technology

(Robins & Levidow, 1995, p. 109).
One of the first commercial versions of VR technology, BattleTech, was
based on simulators of military tanks (Pimental & Teixeira, 1993, p. 211).
The reverse also occurred when the marines adopted the popular
computer game Doom as a training tool Oordan, 1999, p. 189). The nuclear
bomb is perhaps the most explicit symbol of military and technological
power. Stenger (cited in Slouka, 1995, p. 30) unashamedly praises
cyberspace as "the new bomb, a pacific blaze that will project the imprint
of our disembodied selves on the walls of eternity".

Underneath the religious rhetoric VR is about control. Yet it is a
sense of control that goes further than that of many other technologies.
Previous teclmologies have attempted to control the physical environment
which is ultimately a futile project. The human race is a grain of sand
within the universe. We will never control our complete destiny. VR
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attempts to subvert this problem by creating an artificial universe that can
be known in every minute computable detail. The goal of VR is flight from
the chaotic nature of the physical environment: "all this is driven by a
feverish belief in transcendence: a faith that, this time round, that a new

technology will finally and truly deliver us from the limitations and
frustrations

of this imperfect world" (Robins, 1996, p. 2). Within this

realm there are no surprises as everything is accounted for. As Heim puts

it, "computerized reality synthesizes everything through calculation and
nothing exists in the synthetic world that is not literally knowable" (Heim,
1993, p. 105).

The advocates of cyberspace seem to revel in this idea. Crandall
and Levich (1998, p. 86) point out that "Virtual Reality involves a notion
of special empowerment-the sense that somehow one can, via

machinery, 'graduate' from reality to something better". jaron Lanier
expounds this attitude: "In VR there's no question your reality is created
by you. You made it ... I think being in that mode of realizing how active
every moment in life is will break through the stupor" (cited in Crandall &
Levich, 1998, p. 90). Benedikt, another well known champion of
cyberspace, expresses the same sentiment when he states that we 'Will be

able "to dwell empowered or enlightened on mythic planes" (1991, p. 6).
This belief in transcendence is once again closely linked to the Judea-

Christian theology that

has been drawn upon to make sense of

technology.

Those awaiting the dawn of this new artificial world seem to have
an aversion to the uncertain, capricious nature of the actual world. Slouka

(1995, p. 21) links their desire for a perfect world with their desire for
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control:

Totalists uf all stripes, after all, have always been linked by
their common desire to transform the world in their own
intage. Totalitarian visions- whether utopian fantasies or
dystopian nightmares-have shared an aversion to the
world in all its quotidian messiness, as well as a
corresponding preoccupation with cleanliness, order and

control. All similarly, have been characterised by a vast
arrogance, an unshakable belief in their own vision of a
different world .... Theorists in virtual systems, if anything,
went further, their disdain for the world was more
complete ... they wanted the apocalypse.
Slouka dramatises the situation, but his linking of a desire for a new world
with an urge for power and control I think is valid.

Noble (1999, p. 207) argues that technologists often display, "a
pathological dissatisfaction with, and deprecation of, the human
condition". Hayles' (cited in Robbins, 1996, p. 5) comments support this
claim as she shows an almost phobic distaste for the real world:

In a world despoiled by overdevelopment, overpopulation,
and time-release environmental poisons, it is comforting to

think that physical forms can recover their pristine purity by
being

reconstituted

as

informational

patterns

in

a

multidimensional computer space. A cyberspace body, like a
cyberspace landscape, is immune to blight and corruption.
This attitude towards the physical world has its grounding in the

Enlightenment thinking that I outlined in the first chapter.

Descartes

(cited in Noble, 1999, p. 144) also looked upon the physical negatively. He
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believed that

the human body reflected mankind's "epistemological

falleness" and was ''opposed to reason". He too dreamed of a perfect
realm, except Descartes' heaven was located in the areas of geometry and
arithmetic, which were of "heavenly birth" because they, "alone deal with
an object so pure and uncomplicated, that they need make no assumptions

at all which experience renders uncertain" (Cited in Noble, 1999, p. 145).

Popular Texts

Much of this technological rhetoric has seeped into other more
popular discourses. Recently several films have explored the subject of
Virtual Reality and have also linked religion to VR. The film Lawnmower
man (1992) is about a VR researcher, Larry Angelo, who uses VR
technology for speeding up education and intelligence. Larry uses the
technology on a young, simple man called Jobe. In Hebrew the name Jobe
means "God is the Father" (Benjamin, 1983, p. 157).Witll the assistance of
the technology Jobe learns at an amazing pace and he quickly takes on
messianic airs. He decides to project himself permanently into the virtual
world where he can be total master, where nothing will be hidden from
him. Once in the realm he exclaims, "I am God here!"

In the film eXistenZ (1999) the famous designer of Virtual Reality

games Allegra Geller is described as the, "game-pod goddess." The trial

run of her latest game, '' eXistenZ" occurs in a church, where the
prospective players of the game worship and revere Allegra. One of the
games she has designed is call 'ArtGod' because, "thou the player of the
game art God."

25

In Wild Palms (1993) the company that makes the Virtual Reality
technology doubles as a church: The Church of Synthiotics.

lbe VR

program they create is called "Church Windows" and the employees of
this company/church regularly pause to pray together. Whilst in !ohnny
Mnemonic (1995) good and evil spirits dwell within the virtual world.

Yet far from embracing the claims of the 'virtualists' some of these
films have portrayed a decidedly pessimistic future that diverges sharply
from the techno-utopia that many of the VR gurus envisage. The world
of eXistenZ is an unstable, frustrating nightmare where the real and the
unreal are indistinguishable. Ted Pikul one of the characters in the film
comments, 11 I'm not sure here where we are is real at all!"

As Jobe in Lawrunower Man becomes more obsessed with VR
technology he turns into a maniacal tyrant who wants to take over the
world, as does Tony Kroitzer, the master/owner of the Church of
Synthiotics in Wild Palms. Kroitzer is revealed as a power obsessed,
duplicitous ctiminal who tries to kill his own son. He tries to attain
immortality by projecting himself into the VR world, but fails and dies.
The film Brainscan (1994) along with Wild Palms and Lawrunower Man
also links the quest for a virtual world with omnipotence fantasies.

The Matrix (1999) aligns Virtuni Reality with control. The Matrix
projects a dystopian future where l""Jple are controlled by computers and
immersed in a virtual world called 'The Matrix'. According to Morpheous
one of the characters, the Matrix is, "a computer generated dream-world
built to keep us under control." The Matrix is one huge surveillance

system, an artificial prison.

2o

These films reflect common fears about technological change. Are

any of these fears justified? Is there the possibility that one day we may be
spending our time in a system not unlike 1he Matrix? This is a question I
explore in the next chapter.

Here I have shown how those involved in VR technology through
their comments reveal that they share an urge for mastery. Their constant

referral to themselves as Gods and their utopian dreams of a totally
artificial world reflect their cravings for control. Horkheimer and Adorno
claimed that the "Enlightenment was totalitarian" (1979, p. 6). Today we
see the same values and totalitarian tendencies shown in the discourse

concerning Virtual Reality.
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A POSSIBLE DYSTOPIA.

Whether it be the stump jump plough, or the nuclear bomb
throughout history many technologies have been used as tools for control
of the environment and for the exercise of power over humanity. Part of
the reason for this is because these technologies have been located within

the context of modernity, and have been part of the modem ideology of
rational control and ordering. In the previous chapter I sketched how the
discourse on Virtual Reality is influenced by the ideology of order and
control. Yet we have not seen how this discourse will manifest itsell in the
use of VR technology as Virtual Reality is yet to be implemented on any
wide scale. When and exactly how (if at all) the dream of virtual
cyberspace is realised is something impossible to predict.

As mentioned in the introduction I am using my own particular
conception of Virtual Reality. In this chapter I am using the notion of
Virtual Reality as a computer simulated, three dimensional environment
that people can access from differing geographical locations and where
they can interact with each other. I make the assumption that such a
system would require a central computer to generate and maintain the

virtual environment. In this chapter I look at the increasing use of
surveillance within modern society and argue that it is part of the overall
ideology of order and control. The alignment of Virtual Reality with the
same ideology, means that it too will reflect the values of order and
control. As Fairclough (1992, p. 3) points out, "discourses do not just
roflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or
constitute them". I argue that in the future there is the possibility that VR
technology may continue the modern use of surveillance.
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ln the previou& chapter we saw how those involved in the creation

of Virtual Reality technology often

conceive of themselves as Gods.

Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
(1962) offers a conception of God that in several ways parallels the
controller/creator of a virtual environment. Berkeley argued that because
all we are aware of is our sensations, we can never verify the existence of a
material reality. All we know of are sense data that our brain receives via
our five senses. Therefore we cannot jump to the conclusion that there is a

material reality beyond these senses, for all we have is sense data and
nothing else (Berkeley, 1962, p. 69):
Now, if it be

certain that those original qualities

(assumed, material reality) are inseparably united with the
other sensible qualities, (sense data) and not, even in
thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly
follows that they exist only in the mind.
If nothing exists externally but only in the mind as Berkeley concludes

then something must be creating these perceptions within the mind. He
believed that these perceptions must be created by God.

Berkeley's theory of our actual world corresponds with the world
of Virtual Reality. In VR all we are aware of is our sense perceptions.
These sense perceptions give the impression of an external world, yet in

fact they are just illusions created in our mind by someone (not God but a
computer programmer). Berkeley's God instead becomes a being that has
created VR technology. Virilio draws the same comparison: "the
technologies of virtual reality are attempting to make us see from beneath,
from inside, from behind ... as if we were God" (Virilio, 1997, p. 44). The
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comp.,rison of VR with Berkeley's treatise highlights the God-like position
that the creator/controller of a virtual world may have. Yet it also displays
the tremendous amount of power that they will wield.

If we apply Foucault's work on power relations in Discipline and

Punish (1977) we can see just how much power the controller of the VR
environment may have. Foucault highlights the link between power and
visibility in the modern age. He does this by using Jeremy Bentham's
architectural design, the Panopticon as a "diagram of a mechanism of
power reduced to its ideal form" (Foucault, 1977, p. 205). Foucault ( 1977,
p. 200) explains the Panopticon:
at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a
tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open

onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is
divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width
of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside,
corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on
the outside, allows light to cross the cell from one end to
the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor
in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a
patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.

What the Panopticon reveals is the strength that surveillance has as a form
of control. All the inmates in the Panopticon can be looked at by a
supervisor all the time. Nothing can get past the supervisor, so he has

control, at a distance, over what the inmates do: 'The major
effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power"
(Foucault, 1977, p. 201).
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It is important to note that Bentham designed the Panopticon in

1787 at the peak of Enlightenment thought (Whitaker, 1999, p. 32).
Accordingly the

design accurately reflects many of the values and

assumptions of the Enlightenment that I highlighted in the first chapter.
There is the separation of prisoner into subject to be observed that

accurately reflects Descartes' subject/object distinction. Yet primarily the
Panopticon is a technology of control that makes the observer the, 'master

and possessor' of human nature. As Lyon (1994, p. 62) observes about the
Panopticon: "Enlightenment reason, concerned with empirical observation

and classification, and related to the rational reproducing of social order,
is neatly expressed".

The thing that strikes me about the Panopticon is the similarity
between the position of the supervisor within the Panopticon, and the
controller of the VR environment. Like the supervisor in the Panopticon
the VR controller has the ability to view everything that is occurring
within their realm. Yet the VR controller's surveillance capabilities go far
beyond those of the Panopticon, as the VR controller can manipulate
what the people in the VR environment sense, as well as having the power
to view everything they do. This is a tremendous position of power, that
when associated with the discourse of mastery and control that VR
pundits use does not auger well for any possible future where people
spend a significant proportion of time in cyberspace. If the Panopticon is a
mechanism of power, so too is the concept of the virtual environment. It

is not hard to imagine the possible abuses of this power. Foucault (1977, p.
203) highlights some abuses that the Panoptican may be used for that the
VR environment may achieve even more efficiently:
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lt could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to

alter behaviour,

to

train or correct individual'>.

To

experiment with medicines and monitor their effects. To try
out different punishments on prisoners, according to their
ctimes and character, and to seek the most effective ones. To

teach different techniques simultaneously to the workers, to
decide which is the best.
These are extreme examples but it is important to recognise the power

relations that may come with the advent of any widespread use of VR
technology. Foucault calls the Panopticon a, "cruel, ingenious cage"
(Foucault, 1977, p. 205). It is no coincidence that Mark Gibson, one of the
first to envisage the application of VR technology, also described
cyberspace as "an infinite cage" (Cited in Heim, 1993, p. 80).

It is far from certain that any Virtoal Reality technology will be

used for the oppressive purposes that the Panopdcon was designed to
carry out. Yet within Modernity there is a long history of surveillance that
is closely tied to the ideology of order and co,ttrol. Lyon believes that
surveillance is a "vital aspect of the growth of modern societies; indeed, it

helps to define such sO<.ieties" (Lyon, 1994, p, 41). Giddens takes the same
position arguing that, "surveillance in the workplace is a primary featore
of the emergence of industrial capitalism" (Giddens, 1985, p. 147).

The style of production used during the Industrial revolution with
its concentration of labour under the one roof created an environment

more conducive to the surveillance of workers. Then with the rise of a
more advanced form of capitalism there came improved forms of
surveillance. As Whitaker (1999, p. 17) points out, "following the

I
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Industrial Revolution, the factory became a primary site for innovation in
forms of surveillance and discipline." Dandeker highlight• that during the
period from

1890 to 1930, the introduction of 'scientific' management

resulted in a, ufar more detailed surveillance over the whole process of

production"

(Dandeker, 1990, p. 64).

Henry Ford's 'Sociology

Department' that sent out spies to pry into the private lives of his
employees is a good example of this type of 'scientific management'
(Whitaker, 1999, p. 38).

In more recent times there have been new

technologi~s

that have

increased the intensity of surveillance. The computer is the ultimate tool
for compiling large amounts of information. It has often been used as a
surveillance tool by gathering information on people. This gathering of
information has been called 'dataveillance'
monitoring

because rathel"

than

the actual person as in conventional surveillance,

dataveillance works by monitoring information about the person (Clarke,
1994, pp. 122-123).

Credit ratings are the most obvious example of

dataveillance. Companies constantly gather information on how and
when you use your credit cards, and whether you should be trusted. Yet
there are loss obvious and more worrying examples. The Australian Law
Enforcement Access Network (LEAN) contains all of Australia's corporate
data and land ownership details which can be accessed by the
departments of Social Security, Taxation and Federal Police at any time
(Lyon, 1994, p. 40).

This dataveillance also transcends national boundaries and is
completely global in some cases. The UKUSA network is an alliance of the
governments of America and England, with the inclusion of several
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subsidiaf'J countries including Australia. The network was initially set up
to monitor the telecommunications of the Soviets during the Cold War.

Yet the alliance continues today and it has the ability to monitor nearly all
the worlds' tele-communications (Whitaker, 1999, p. 92).

Yet modem surveillance is not always in the form of large scale
state run databases. It can also be focused on much smaller areas such as

the workplace. A novel example is the 'Nannycam', a video camera
m;uketed for parents to install surreptitiously in their homes to monitor
how Nanny's look after their children (Whitaker, 1999, p. 80). In America
up to a third of corporations also monitor their employees electronically,
with techniques like e-mail spot checks (Whitaker, 1999, p. 105). There are
other more complex systems of surveillance like the overview computer

system at a timber mill documented by Zuboff. The overview system
records information throughout the plant every five seconds. One of the
managers of the plant said, "This computer is like X-ray vision." He then
goes on: "its like lifting up the rock and letting the roaches scurry out. If
the employee blows it, it's clear right away. You can know who didn't do
what. If a person stops concentrating you know it from the data" (Zuboff,
1988, pp. 316-317).

This increase in the level of surveillance within our society has not
stopped. As Lyon (1994, p. 204) states, there is a "constant quest" for new
technologies that make surveillance more complete and more efficient.
Thermal cameras now make it possible to view things in complete
darkneso, whilst satellites can distinguish objects on the ground of less
than a metre in diameter (Whitaker, 1999, p. 87).

In America some

prisoners are now sentenced to home detention, whilst being monitored
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by electronic tags attached to their body (Mitchell, 1996, p. 77). There
seems to be no stopping the degree to which surveillance technology can
be applied as researchers in japan create 'cyberinsects'. They have
attached microcomputer backpacks on cockroaches that send impulses to

their legs so the cockroaches can be remotely guided. These cockroaches
can then be attached to miniature surveillance cameras and microphones

(Whitaker, 1999, p. 86).

Bentham's efforts to maintain order through technology with his
invention of the Panopticon is part of the same ideolcgy as the new forms
of surveillance used today. As Lyon (1994, p, 77) puts it:
Bentham, following the Cartesian logic that regarded human
beings as machines whose activities could be measured and

controlled, wrote impersonality, abstract classification, and
automatic power into the Panopticon. Precisely these
features reappear, now digitally inscribed and intensified, in
the new, computer-run surveillance.

People are now classified merely as part of an economic machine as good
consumers of certain products or credit risks. Alternatively the state will
see them only in terms of their probability to commit a crime.

With the increasing use of dataveillance Poster fears the creation of
a 'Superpanopticon' (cited in jordan, 1999 p. 201). Yet perhaps the
Superpanopticon will only occur when and if virtual environments
become places where people spend a significant amount of their time. As
I have demonstrated, the goal of VR advocates is a totally known and
controllable world. An advantage and perhaps one of the goals behind
the urge to create a cyber-world is that such a world would be open to

35

complete surveillance. Bogard (1996, p. 37) believes that the essence of
Virtual Reality is about surveillance:
the promise of virtual reality- its imaginary- is in fact the
pure surveillance machine ... This is surveillance taken, in

imagination, to its highest level, to the very point of
surpassing itself. [n virtual systems we are promised

essentialized views of unlimited worlds, perfect control, all
contingencies, variables, and paths accounted for, a perfect,

delusional control-hypercontrol...A self contained, ultraobservable, and graspable world.

This creation of cyberspace as a surveillance machine is currently a

long way from being realised. The important point is to appreciate that
the phenomenon of surveillance that has existed since the Industrial
Revolution is a reflection of the ordering mindset that has reigned
throughout the modern period. This mindset has influenced the trajectory
of science and technology within the Western world and has, as I have
shown, manifested itself in a discourse of Virtual Reality. What is needed
to resist the implementation of a superpanopticon, is an alteration of the
ways we think.
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AN ALTERNA11VE WAY Of THINKING.

The predominant rationalist type of thinking used in the fields of
science and technology needs to be tempered by the application of
different philosophies. Virtual Reality has been used as an exam pie of
how the ideology of control and order can affect the conception of a
technology. Virtual Reality needs to be separated from this

ideology

through the use of different ways of thinking about technology and the
world.

This may result in a different practice and application of

technology.

In this chapter I will use the philosophy of Martin Heidegger as a

guide towards developing a new way of thinking. Heidegger's philosophy
is dense and complex, and it would be unwise for me to claim that what
follows is a direct application of his philosophy. It is more a synthesis of
some of his writings and my own ideas that developed from
comprehending these writings. Heidegger's philosophy could be seen as
the search for the meaning of Being. At the beginning of his major work
Being and Time (1962, p. 1) Heidegger writes, "do we in our time have an
answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not
at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of

Being." Heidegger's philosophy is firmly focused upon our existence and
the existence of entities within this world.

There have

been many criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy.

Irigaray (1999) criticizes his work for being masculinist, however, the
primary question concerning Martin Heidegger has been his Nazi
affiliations (see Young 1997, Wolin, 1993, Rockmore, 1992). Wolin (1993, p.
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2) argues that Heidegger's, 'alliance with Nazism, far from being a
temporary mnrriage of convenience, was grandiose and profound". Yet

others including Derrida (1989) and Lacoue-Labarthe (1990) have written
extended defenses of Heidegger's work by claiming that much of his later
philosophy is anti-national socialism. This is a huge debate that raises
many questions beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet I think we should not
fall prey to an ad hominem criticism but rather judge Heidegger's writing
on its merits and not just condemn all of it because of his association with
Nazism.

Heidegger

critiques

the

rationalist

mindset born

in

the

Enlightenment for its narrowness and its casting of a conceptual veil over
the world. The scientific order may show us one way of looking at things
but there are other valuable ways that have to a large extent been
abandoned for a long time within the modern western world. Heidegger
advocates a broader and more meditative type of thinking. It is this type
of thinking that I will elaborate on and offer as an alternative to the
rational/ calculative type of thinking.

One of Heidegger's key criticisms is that "science does not think."
(Heidegger, 1968, p. 8). This seems a strange statement but what
Heidegger means is that science is a specialised area that can only deal
with issues concerning its own field.

Scientific

thinking takes place

within a conceptual framework and it cannot 'think' outside that area.
Science and technology is successful at breaking things down into separate
parts, putting those parts into a system and then being able to control
those things. The physicist can successfully tell us how atoms interact
with each other and the engineer can build a combustion engine. such
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wonders of modem science arc important to us, but the scientist should
not control our world view.

Science tells us very little about morals,

ethics, politics, art and many other areas of life.

Scientific thinking always views things at the same level. Heidegger
calls it "one track thinking " in a direct reference to the train trrtck, a

product of modernity. (Heidegger, 1968, p. 26). This attitude tends to
block out other ways of viewing things, ways that may be very, valuable
to us, but that have been pushed aside by the dominance of the scientific
explanation of our world. Heidegger (1968, p. 43) uses the exam pie of a
tree:

for we shall forfeit everything before we know it, once t1.1e
sciences ... display the panoply of their documents and
proofs, to explain to us that what we see and accept is
properly not a tree but in reality a void, thinly sprinkled
with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon
at enormous speeds.

The tree has been reduced to the mere stuff of the standing reserve,
outlined in the first chapter. We have gained a great deal from using a
scientific outlook, but we should not see it as the only way to view things.

What is needed is a freeing from the constant categorisation and
evaluation of things that occurs with scientific thinking. For in "marking
something a 'value' we rob the thing evaluated of its dignity. This means:
in esteeming something as a value, the evaluated is admitted only as an
object for the estimation of man" (Heidegger cited in Harries, 1967, p. 182).
The tree should not only be seen as a collection of a toms, nor as an asset of
the timber company. The tree should be also seen on the merits of its
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appearance to us:

When we think through what this is, that a tree in bloom
presents itself to us so that we can come and stand face-toface with it, the thing that matters first and foremost, and

finally, is not to drop the tree in bloom, but for once let it
stand where it stands ... to this day, thought has never let the
tree stand where it stands (Heidegger, 1968, p. 44).

In the first chapter I displayed the evidence of the 'one track

thinking' that has dominated throughout modernity. What is needed is an
alternative way of thinking that does not exhibit the same narrowness. A
broader, less rigid way of thinking that will provide us with the ability to
solve some of the

problems of modernity in ways different to those

offered by 'scientific thinking'. Heidegger's discussion of such a thinking
is deliberate:y elusive because the introduction of any specific guidelines

will result in the thought being ordered and controlled. Yet despite this
limitation I think we can provide an idea of what this alternative thinking
would be like.

One of the key elements of this thinking is a sense of surrender.
Instead of trying to dominate the environment, we need to sit back, stop
acting, and reflect on what is before us. Within modernity there has been
great change, and there continues to be great change. Scientists delve into
areas like cloning without enough reflection on the implications of these
massive alterations to our world:

we do not yet have reflection when we have only
consciousness. Reflection is more. It is calm, self-possessed

surrender to that which is worthy of questioning ...
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Reflection is of a different essence from the making
conscious and

the

knowing

that belong

to

science

(Heidegger, 1977, p. 180).

In conjunction with the notion of reflection there needs to be a
sense of openness to what is being reflected upon: "It is necessary for

thinking to become explicitly aware of the matter here called opening"
(Heidegger, 1978, p. 385). What is this opening? Heidegger uses the
metaphor of an opening in a forest. Within the forest it is difficult to grasp
anything except what is in front of you. Yet the opening is a place where
we can stand back and see things more clearly. (Heidegger, 1978, p. 384).
Heidegger also quotes Goethe to explain it: "look for nothing behind
phenomena: they themselves are what is to be learned" (Goethe in
Heidegger, 1978, p. 385). If we let something exist as it appears, then we
may gain a greater understanding of it.

This openness carries with it a sense of broadness- a non-specific,

wide ranging altitude towards things. Too often sciences' narrow fields of
special knowledge fail to take into account the bigger social implications
of what they are doing. As Barrett (1964, p. 4) points out:
doctors and engineers tend to see things from the viewpoint
of their own specialty, and usually show a very marked
blind spot to whatever ,alJs outside this particular province.
The more sharper a vision, the sharper its focus; but also the
more nearly total the blind spot toward all things that lie on
the periphery of this focus.

This problem has been displayed throughout the history of technology,
most notably by the scientist's urge to split the atom, despite its
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destructive consequences.

Lastly this alternative thinking needs to be less ego-<:entred and
have mar~ of a holistic attitude towards humanity and the natural world.

As mentioned in the first chapter one of Heidegger's chief criticisms of
western thought is its separation of humanity into subject and the world
into obje::t. This sepdration has caused western societies perception of the
environment as the 'standing reserve.' What is needed is an adoption of

the philosophy that humans and the world are intimately tied together;
that they are two parts of the one thing.

This is a belief that is part of many

Native American and

Indigenous Australian cultures. Many Native Americans groups believe
that if you desecrate the land it will have repercussions for you: "the
Iroquois consider, that there is a reciprvcal relationship between nature
and man: if you take something from nature, you must give something

else back" (Hultkrantz, 1981, p. 130). Chief Seattle expresses the same idea:
"For whatever happens to the beasts soon happens to man. All things are
connected" (Chief Seattle, 1994, p. 16). Anne Pattel-Gray (cited in
Stockton, 1995, p. 81) explains a similar understanding within Indigenous
Australian culture.
In our view the earth is sacred. It is a living entity in which
other living entities have origin and destiny ... We are bound
to the earth in our spirit. By means of our involvement in the

natural world we can ensure our well-being.
This is a type of thinking that has in recent times gained currency among
some groups, particularly many modem environmental groups.
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This is one of the key points to Heidegger' s philosophy concerning
science and technology.

Heidegger (1968, p. 35) states that "since

Copernicus, science no longer recognises sunrises and sunsets". What is

meant by this is that modern man with all his knowledge has lost touch
with his surroundings and in doing so has lost touch with himself. Barrett
when explaining Heidegger' s philosophy expresses this view well:
the businessman who flies to the country for a week-end, is

whisked off to golf, tennis, sailing, entertains his guests
successfully, all on a split-second schedule, and at the end of
the week-end flies back to the city, but without once having
had the occasion or the desire to lose himself walking down
a country lane. Such a man, we say, is marvelously organised

and really knows how to manage things. And, to be sure, he
does show an admirable mastery over things; over beings
but not Being, with which he never comes in contact. To lose

oneself wallcing down a country lane is, literally, to lose the
self that is split off from nature: to enter the region of Being
where subject and object no longer confront each other in
murderous division ... The man of today, technological man,

is the final descendent of Cartesian man, but without
Descartes' passion for clear and distinct ideas. As Descartes,

locked up in his own luminous ego, confronted a world of
material

objects

as

thoroughly

alien

and

perhaps

unknowable, so technological man faces objects in his world
with no need or capacity for intimacy with them beyond the
knowledge of what button has to be pressed in order to
control their working (Barret, 1964, p. 207).
If we can regain this reflective, meditative thinking and reduce the divide
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between humanity and the natural world, then perhaps we will also be in
a better position to reduce the divisions between people.

The rationalist mindset has not only imposed a separation between
humans and their environmentr but as outlined in the first chapter it has
instituted a division between people. Other people are al'io seen as object,

and as part of the standing reserve. A less ego-<:entred attitude that can
reduce the divide between subject and object, may result in more empathy
for our fellow human beings. Rather than using science and technology for
the exercise of power and control, it can be used as an aid for people in

their everyday lives. I think we should focus upon human existence and
use technology for the basic life needs of all people.

The project of Virtual Reality has been to create an artificial
environment that is tantamount to our actual physical world. The goal has
been to transcend the world, to become a god.

Such a project only

manages to increase the separation between man and his environment.

Within the virtual world everything becomes artifice, with no meaning or
significance at all. As Cynthia Cockburn (cited in Noble, 1999, p. 208)
points out this emphasis upon creating a new heavenly realm is
misguided:
transcendence is a wrong-headed concept. . .It means escape

from the earth-bound and the repetitive, climbing above the
everyday. It means putting men on the moon before feeding
and housing the world's poor ... The revolutionary step
would be to bring men down to earth.

44

There is almost a reluctance to accept the uncanny nature of our existence

in the 'virtualist's' goals. As Robins and Webster (1999, p. 245) point out,
"virtual culture is a culture of retreat from the world". It is a culture that is
trying to circumvent the

circumstancc~s

of our existence. The discourse of

Virtual Reality draws upon Christian mythology of a utopian, infinite
realm because there is an urge to escape the harsh realities of our finite

lives. This avoidance of our ultimate fate upon earth is something that
Heidegger writes about. He believes that escapist notions are 'inauthentic'
and we need to accept our situation:

Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is
not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for
accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for
ones own death, one is liberated from ones lostness in those

possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon
one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time
one can authentically understand and choose among the
factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is
not be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that
its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it
shatters all ones tenaciousness to whatever existence one has

reached. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 308).

This is a difficult quote, but what I understand Heidegger to be saying is
that if we accept our bleak existence we are freed from 'those possibilities'
like the 'virtualist's' delusion of a utopian realm so that we can focus upon
our actual circumstances in life.

The question has to be asked whether Virtual Reality is worth
developing at all. There is no obvious use for the technology that is going

45

to aid humanity greatly. Talking about creating an artificial utopia for
people to dwell in is ignoring the reality of many peoples' situation in the
world. Poverty and starvation are evident throughout the world. Many
people do not have access to sufficient food, let alone the technology
needed to immerse themselves in a virtual environment. These are the

issues that technologists should attend to first. Unfortunately the narrow
technological ideology has tended to guide the application of science and
technology into mastering and possessing nature, much more than aiding
people in their basic needs. This is because of the separation between

people that occurs with the modern rationalist mindset. Like Heidegger's
example of the tree, people, are seen as a collection of atoms, rather than

solely as people. Robert Macnamara, (cited in Dickson, 1974, p. 59) the
former president of the World Bank displayed such a view when he said
that the cost of raising a child in a third world country was six hundred
dollars whilst the cost of avoiding its birth through birth control was
merely six dollars. Perhaps with the application of the alternative way of
thinking that I have sketched here, more appropriate uses of technology

may occur.

With a new thinking Virtual Reality may be use<! for more rdevant
purposes. Virtual Reality may al•o help us to gain back a sense of oneness
with the world. The current proponents of VR want to create a new
world. Yet if we anchor the technology to representations relating to our
actual physical world we may gain some benefits. The sense of immersion
and the ability to manipulate the virtual environment mean that we can
wear the virtual world like a garment. If this virtual world is related to the
actual world then we may gain a greater sense of our interconnection with
the actual world. Char Davies OSMOSE exhibit created in 1995 uses
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Virtual Reality for just this purpose. The gallery description describes
OSMOSE as "an art work that seeks to heal the rational Cartesian
mind/body, subject/ object split which has shaped so many of our cultural
values especially towards nature" (cited in 1-leim, 1998, p. 163). The
OSMOSE environment consists of natural settings where the VR
participant can merge with natural objects. A participant describes the
experience:

I am out of the dense forest and into a cozy clearing. Some
leaves lie on the ground, a pond, a stream, and a huge oak
tree generously giving its shade. I drink it in. I cruise around
this area. I want to touch the tree but because I have no
physical form, I cannot. I glide up through the tree and
surround myself with their damp, exquisite beauty (Cited in
Heim 1998, p. 164).
Davies realises the importance of not trying to create a new world, but
that VR should be used to complement the real world:
OSMOSE is not a replacement for walking in the woods. It is
rather a filtering of nature through an artist's vision using
technology to distill or amplify certain interpretative aspects,

so that those who enter it can see freshly, can become resensitized, and can remember what it's like to feel wonder
(Cited in Heim 1998, p. 166).

Virtual Reality should also be used in a way that can help people in
their everyday lives. The Virtual Environments Group at the Georgia
Institute of Technology in the United States is applying Virtual Reality
technology to help people overcome phobias. They use 'exposure therapy'
which involves "exposing the patient to a virtual environment containing
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tlw feared stimulus in place of taking the patient to a real environment"
(no author, online, 2000). The use of an artificial situation lessens the
impact for the patient of confronting the slim ulus, whilst still working
them towards dealing with their fears. The group has used this type of
therapy successfully with people who have a fear of heights, a fear of
flying and people with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the
Vietnam war. Such a application of Virtual Reality technology shows a
urge to help fellow humans that fits in well with the alternative attitude
toward technology that I have outlined here.

The advantage with Virtual Reality is that it is a technology that
has not yet been fully realized. Therefore we have an opportunity to create
something without having to alter and change what has occurred in the
past. Virtual Reality is an opportunity. There are many ways into the
future, perhaps the dream of Virtual Reality will never eventuate, it may
remain the object of fiction. Yet as with all technologies, we must resist the
discourse of control and order, and realise that there are alternative ways

of thinking about technology and the world.
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CONCLUSION.

Within this thesis I have argued that a discourse of Virtual Reality
centres upon the valuing of order and control. The primary way that this
is achieved

is

through

the

proponents of VR

drawing

upon

Judea/Christian religious mythology. They draw a parallel between their
creation of a virtual world and God's creation of the actual world. The
advocates of VR also compare their belief that the experience of Virtual
Reality is empowering with the experience of being a god. They also use
the Christian belief in transcendence by likening the creation of an
artificial, controllable world to a heavenly, non-physical utopian realm.

I

contend that these comments of the VR experts reveal a desire for control

and order. Their drawing upon the conception of God as an all powerful
creator, and their urge to transcend their limited physical reality, to a
totally controllable artificial reality demonstrate their implicit valuing of
order and control.

The reason that Virtual Reality is conceived in this way is because it
is i.!>.lluenced by the larger valuing of control and order that is a part of

modernity. This has been particnlarly pronounced in the fields of science
and technology. Due to VR's conception and application largely occurring
within the fields of science and technology, it has consequently been
affected by their regard for order and control.

Modernity is littered with examples of the ideology of order and
control manifesting itself within society.

The rise of surveillance

techniques within modem society is a prime example. Technology has
often been deployed to make surveillance more efficient. I suggest that
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Virtual Reality technology as it is conceived within the ideology of order
and control may be used as a surveillance technology.

For Virtual Reality technology to be used for other purposes it must
first of all be separated from the prevailing modern attitude that values
order and control.

To do this alternative ways of thinking about

technology are needed . I offer the philosophy of Martin Heidegger as one
such alternative. Heidegger was critical of scientific thinking for its
narrowness, its marking of everything as a value to be ordered, and its
inability to accommodate differing philosophies. He advocated a broader,
more open style of thinking that did not see objects within a scientific
framework but saw them on their merits.

With the use of different

attitudes towards technology, new uses may forwarded. In the last
chapter I provided a couple of examples of uses for Virtual Reality.
Instead of advocating a new heavenly realm to dwell in, these uses relate
back to the actual world, and the real problems people face.
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